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NO. 20 MAY 2020 Introduction 
Covid-19 in the Horn of Africa 
Gaining Trust in a Crisis 
Annette Weber 
On reaching the Horn of Africa, the corona virus will have encountered countries 
already facing a multitude of challenges. Prolonged armed conflict, drought and 
insecurity have turned more than eight million people into refugees in their own 
countries, and a further 3.5 million have fled to neighbouring countries where they 
live in overcrowded refugee camps. All the countries in this region are in a fragile 
state of political transformation or have been severely weakened by war and govern-
ment failures. They possess neither the capacity to contain the Covid pandemic nor 
to mitigate the resulting unemployment, poverty and hunger. In order to guard 
against jeopardising the process of democratisation in Sudan and Ethiopia, special 
emphasis should be placed on social security systems and gaining the trust of the 
population. This requires an emergency aid package from abroad that will ensure the 
economic survival of all countries in the region. However, long-term support should 
be conditional on guaranteeing that most of the investment goes into developing 
state capacities for critical infrastructure and social security. 
 
The legitimacy of the government and the 
degree of trust the population has in its 
leadership are key to effectively combating 
Covid-19 and coping with its consequential 
losses. These factors will determine whether 
a country can enforce life-saving measures 
or whether social unrest breaks out. 
How a country is governed now will shape 
the relationship between the state and the 
population in the aftermath of the pandemic. 
Although there is currently strong support 
for incumbent governments, approval may 
start to wane if there is an upsurge in infec-
tion rates, starvation or riots. 
Meanwhile, the danger of authoritarian 
regimes becoming entrenched increases 
the longer the executive retains supreme 
power. For example, the government in 
Somalia is preventing journalists from 
being critical in their reporting. The govern-
ment in Ethiopia is blocking Internet com-
munication in certain parts of the country. 
Fears are also growing that Prime Minister 
Abiy Ahmed will impose a state of emer-
gency to further postpone elections, dis-
solve parliament and appoint a caretaker 
government. This would damage the gov-
ernment’s legitimacy and make reconcilia-
tion more difficult in this politically and 
ethnically fragmented country. 
Drastic measures to prevent the virus 
from spreading have been taken by all the 
SWP Comment 20 
May 2020 
2 
countries in this region. There is a very real 
risk that food shortages, starvation, looting 
and social unrest will lead to state failure 
and armed conflicts. The longer the restric-
tions apply and the more people govern-
ments are unable to feed, the more un-
stable the region will become. 
Current Situation in the Horn 
Many countries in the Horn of Africa are 
still in the early stages of the pandemic. 
Although the number of cases is low, so is 
the level of testing, making it difficult to 
draw any accurate conclusions. 
Sudan’s response to the outbreak was 
Rapid. The government closed its borders 
before a single case of Covid had been iden-
tified in the country. Night-time curfews 
apply throughout Sudan and a comprehen-
sive lockdown was imposed in the capital, 
Khartoum. The Sudanese prime minister is 
still riding on a wave of support from the 
population. The experience of the country’s 
recent overthrow and renewal has largely 
united the Sudanese people. Nevertheless, 
the government’s position is built on sand, 
as it cannot fully rely on its institutions 
which are still mainly staffed by members 
of the old regime. 
Acts of sabotage and disruption by rep-
resentatives of the old regime are increas-
ing. For example, General Hamad, the gov-
ernor of the capital, refused to enforce a 
ban on assembly for mosques in Khartoum. 
Islamists from the ranks of the former Bashir 
regime are holding demonstrations against 
the Prime Minister’s government and call-
ing for the military to take power. Attacks 
on state institutions in protest at restric-
tions on free movement and government 
curfews have been reported in the north, 
and could increase nationwide. The balance 
of power between the military and civilians 
in the transitional government still remains 
finely poised. Moreover, the armed oppo-
sition has also responded positively to the 
United Nations Secretary-General’s appeal 
to declare a temporary ceasefire as a result 
of the crisis. 
The situation in neighbouring Ethiopia 
is somewhat different. Up until March, 
Ethiopian Airlines continued to fly to China 
daily. The government was late in appeal-
ing to the population to stay at home. In 
contrast, Ethiopian manufacturing busi-
nesses reacted quickly. Textile factories 
switched production to protective face 
masks. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is play-
ing the role of a regional crisis coordinator. 
Ethiopian Airlines are flying aid deliveries 
to the continent via Addis Ababa. Abiy 
Ahmed has also successfully presented him-
self in the media as a representative of the 
continent, mobilising the necessary aid in-
vestments through op-eds and letters. In the 
country itself, however, confidence in the 
government is waning, at least in some 
quarters. Rumours of dictatorial measures 
and pending arrests of political opponents 
are rife, especially on the Internet. 
The situation is most desperate in Soma-
lia and Southern Sudan. Acute conflicts 
in both these Horn countries have caused 
mass displacement and there is little hope 
of political rapprochement or a ceasefire, 
like the one currently in place in Sudan. 
Despite the peace treaty, the population’s 
trust in its former opponents in South 
Sudan is fragile. Violent clashes between 
enemy groups continue to take place. More 
than half of the population is dependent 
on food aid and a functioning health sys-
tem has not yet been set up. More than 2.2 
of the 12 million inhabitants mainly live 
in neighbouring countries as refugees and 
around 1.5 million are displaced in their 
own country. Humanitarian aid organisa-
tions are overseeing the provision of sup-
plies, partly under the protection of the 
UN peacekeeping mission UNMISS. Since 
the government has, yet again, outsourced 
the provision of basic supplies for its popu-
lation to international aid organisations, 
it is not expected to take on management 
tasks in this crisis. The government in Juba 
is unlikely to use the crisis to build con-
fidence and its legitimacy is therefore likely 
to dwindle further. 
Of all the countries in the region, Somalia 
faces the greatest challenges. A third of all 
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15 million Somalis depend on food aid, 2.6 
million have become internally displaced 
due to war or drought and just under one 
million live as refugees in neighbouring 
countries. The central government in Moga-
dishu is in political conflict with some of its 
federal states. These conflicts are exacerbated 
by hostile camps in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). Qatar and Turkey support 
the central government in Mogadishu, 
while the United Arab Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia are providing financial support to 
the states. This situation is only widening 
the gap between the country’s government 
and its states. As a result, capacity-building 
is impossible and measures cannot be im-
plemented. Meanwhile, the jihadist al-Sha-
baab is arming itself and carrying out more 
attacks against Somali security organs and 
the African Union (AU) mission. 
Complicating factors in the Horn of 
Africa region include the consistently dis-
astrous healthcare and the poor health of 
its inhabitants who often suffer from mal-
nutrition and tuberculosis. Another enor-
mous challenge is the high population 
density in the urban areas and the refugee 
camps. The large number of day-labourers 
and workers in the informal sector with no 
savings is also a major problem. Because 
people with underlying health issues are 
particularly at risk from Covid-19, and espe-
cially those over 60, therefore the youth 
factor might yet have a positive effect in 
the Horn of Africa. The average age in the 
region is less than 20 years. 
If the state is unable to provide a certain 
level of social security, it will be difficult 
to convince the population that it has to 
accept work bans, restrictions on free move-
ment and curfews because of Covid-19. 
Structural and actor-related 
factors 
How the policies of the actors in the Horn 
of Africa will change as a result of the 
Covid-19 crisis depends on various factors: 
the legitimacy of the government, corre-
sponding economic development and, last 
but not least, the role of external actors 
during the crisis. 
Legitimacy, leadership and 
acceptance 
State capacities, such as administrative 
capacity and the ability to maintain critical 
infrastructure, will be critical in dealing 
with the virus and the economic and social 
ramifications of the pandemic. 
In its urban centres, the Sudanese lead-
ership can rely on the sense of unity result-
ing from the successful revolution against 
the Bashir regime. This gives it an advan-
tage over those countries in which ethnic, 
social or religious differences divide society. 
There is still a fine balance between the 
civil and military forces in the government, 
which compels them to act jointly. If the 
government does take on coordination 
tasks and starts supplying the population 
with necessary provisions, this will help 
stabilise the country. 
If Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy suc-
ceeds in uniting the population with good 
crisis management, his Medemer project 
(Amharic for synergy or coming together) 
could bring about social stabilisation even 
in a period with economic problems. In 
Ethiopia, parliamentary elections, original-
ly scheduled for May 2020 and then for 
August 2020, have been postponed in-
definitely due to Covid-19. What would 
have caused criticism and violent reactions 
from the opposition a few weeks ago, now 
enjoys almost unanimous support. 
If the prime minister does manage to 
navigate Ethiopia through the crisis in a 
relatively stable manner, his coalition of 
parties will most likely secure victory in the 
upcoming elections. This is an opportunity 
that could quickly go begging if he employs 
repressive politics, like blocking the Inter-
net and telecommunications in the state of 
Oromia. In order to maintain the legitimacy 
of his government, he must ensure trans-
parent communication and include both 
the opposition and the states. However, if 
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is unable to 
convince the populace of the need for the 
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restrictions and if he is unable to involve 
the local level in combating the virus, 
Corona could fast become a catalyst for 
growing conflicts that would break out 
along ethnic and religious lines. 
Covid-19 presents the Somali govern-
ment with existential challenges. Even 
before the pandemic, approval of President 
Mohamed Abdullahi Famajo’s government 
was not overwhelming. The country has 
almost no functioning critical infrastruc-
ture, a third of the population is dependent 
on food supplies, and furthermore, there is 
an open conflict with al-Shabaab. In addi-
tion, the lockdown in place for troops from 
the African Union Mission (AMISOM), is 
weakening the response to al-Shabaab. Apart 
from disputes between the central govern-
ment and the states, its repressive approach 
to the media and journalists has made the 
task of building trust more difficult. 
The new government in South Sudan 
was not officially sworn in until 22 Feb-
ruary 2020, right at the very beginning of 
the pandemic. Since it gained independ-
ence from Sudan in 2011, the county has 
been governed by rivals, President Salva Kiir 
and Vice President Riek Machar. The gov-
ernment alliance failed twice because of 
wrangling between the two camps. The 
result was bloody civil wars that left South 
Sudan in extreme poverty, with ethnic 
disparity and no critical infrastructure for 
health, education and transport. 
Healthcare 
All the countries in the Horn of Africa are 
suffering from a serious shortage of medical 
care and equipment. 
With 557 ventilators and over 570 in-
tensive care beds, Ethiopia is well ahead of 
all the other countries in the region. Sudan 
has 80 ventilators and 200 intensive care 
beds, but only 40 of them are in public 
hospitals. Somalia has 25 intensive care 
beds, but not a single ventilator, and South 
Sudan has 24 beds and 4 ventilators. 
Although Ethiopia has invested more in 
health and education in recent years, the 
country only has 0.1 doctors per 1,000 in-
habitants, in Somalia this figure is even 
worse at 0.023. 
Healthcare in Eritrea is similar to that 
of Ethiopia. However, the country has per-
sisted with its isolationist position, despite 
the Corona crisis. Not even the aircraft with 
aid supplies from Chinese billionaire Jack 
Ma, which were to be distributed across 
Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, received a 
landing permit in Eritrea. 
In Sudan and South Sudan, the dis-
crepancy between official spending on 
the healthcare sector and shortages on the 
ground is particularly striking. According 
to the World Health Organization, Sudan’s 
budget, at 6.34 percent of GDP, is not far 
short of the average for member states of 
the Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE); in Southern Sudan, 
as much as 9.76 percent of GDP is allocated 
to healthcare. In fact, there are 0.43 doctors 
for every 1,000 inhabitants in Sudan, and 
0.15 in South Sudan. For comparison, the 
density of doctors in member states of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) is an average of 
2.89 per 1,000 inhabitants. This seems to con-
firm the suspicion that the healthcare sys-
tem is particularly susceptible to corruption. 
The gap between the numerically small 
elite and the majority of the population 
is also clearly evident in healthcare. While 
there is little investment in the domestic, 
public health sector, the elite mainly go 
abroad to receive treatment, and the travel 
restrictions put in place due to Covid-19 and 
the global overload of health systems are 
currently making it difficult for them to 
travel abroad. That is when the need to in-
vest in your own country becomes more 
obvious. 
For transition governments, in particu-
lar, this situation also represents an oppor-
tunity to combat corruption in the health-
care system. Strategic investments in social 
systems that are supported by the popula-
tion and controlled locally could now set an 
important course for the future. 
However, if governments are unwilling 
to take responsibility for public healthcare, 
this could lead to widespread opposition to, 
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or even attacks on, wards where Covid-19 
patients are being treated. As with Ebola, 
there would also be a risk of corona testing 
stations being attacked, as they are con-
sidered places which spread the virus. 
Factors that serve old, colonial patterns 
make things worse: the lack of solidarity in 
Europe, the racist treatment of Africans in 
China and disturbing statements by French 
doctors that Africa would make a good test-
ing ground for Covid vaccines. The anony-
mous racist abuse on the Internet and 
verbal attacks by Donald Trump on Tedros 
Ghebreyesus, the former Foreign Minister 
of Ethiopia and now Director General of the 
World Health Organization, are also seen 
on the continent as humiliating. In Africa, 
xenophobic reactions are felt by the Chi-
nese, Europeans and humanitarian aid 
workers who are being blamed for intro-
ducing the virus. This, in turn, affects the 
supply of healthcare. People might even 
refuse to receive humanitarian aid by inter-
national organisations as a result of the 
behaviour described above and for other 
reasons: the spread of conspiracy theories, 
shutting down journalists, the lack of trust 
in state media, non-transparent communi-
cation by the authorities and the repressive 
enforcement of curfews. 
Food security 
The Horn of Africa is persistently afflicted 
by severe droughts, floods and famine; an 
infestation of locusts is currently swarming 
the region and fields cannot be cultivated 
because of armed conflicts. Large swathes 
of the population depend on food aid. 
Ethiopia and Sudan have grain reserves, but 
these are not sufficient to feed the affected 
population for a long period. In both coun-
tries, less than ten percent of the popula-
tion is still dependent on humanitarian aid. 
However, one third of the population of 
Somalia and 60 percent of South Sudan rely 
on external aid. Food prices are expected to 
rise as logistics centres, ports and transpor-
tation will all be affected by Covid-19 re-
strictions. As a result, pinch points and 
shortfalls in aid deliveries can be expected. 
This will require coordinating the UN 
organisations. It will be important for coun-
tries in the region to develop a functioning 
supply infrastructure and to build up stocks. 
Economy 
Lockdowns and border closures will mean 
that economies that are already weak will 
face more overwhelming challenges and 
will slip into recession. 
Although a large portion of the population 
works in agriculture, on average, half of gross 
national product (GNP) is generated in cities. 
If food prices are to rise as a result of short-
ages, this will initially affect the urban popu-
lation hardest, since they already lack the 
income they need to survive the lockdown. 
Regional trade in goods, although small, 
has also been restricted by the Covid meas-
ures. When Somalia closed its border, trade 
in the common stimulant Qat collapsed, 
and Kenyan and Ethiopian cultivators were 
left without any income. 
A downturn in the global economy ap-
pears inevitable. The fall in the price of oil 
could have positive effects, for example by 
lowering fuel prices. However, since major 
lenders are located in the Gulf States, an eco-
nomic downturn in these countries will also 
have a negative impact on the Horn of Africa. 
Many people in the Horn have some 
social security in the form of money trans-
fers from family members working abroad. 
Since unemployment is increasing world-
wide, social security, healthcare, tuition 
fees and food security can no longer be 
financed by remittances from abroad. The 
Gulf States will be particularly relevant for 
migrant workers from the region. After the 
2008 financial crisis and the Saudi Vision 
2030 project, which aims to supply the 
labour market in Saudi Arabia with local 
workers, Saudi Arabia sent home more than 
300,000 people who were working in the 
low-wage sector. Even now, thousands are 
being forced to return home to the Horn 
from the Gulf States every week. 
Governments that have so far paid little 
attention to the social security of their popu-
lations now have an increasing obligation. 
SWP Comment 20 
May 2020 
6 
Covid-19 aid packages 
The EU, international financial institutions 
and the G20 have taken measures to cushion 
the most severe economic declines. The G20 
countries want to introduce debt reschedul-
ing for the least developed countries. This 
will apply to $20 billion of debt and come 
into force from May. And it could apply 
to all the countries in the Horn. However, 
none of these countries was named in rela-
tion to the debt moratorium announced by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Of the €3.25 billion the EU is making 
available to African countries to deal with 
the Covid-19 crisis, for the Horn of Africa, 
the majority will go to Sudan (€80 million), 
€10 million will go to Ethiopia, €27 Million 
to Somalia and €5 million to South Sudan. 
Ethiopia also received €76.5 million from 
the World Bank and South Sudan €7 mil-
lion. Somalia, in particular, has benefitted 
from the debt relief programme. 
Access to the international financial 
institutions is particularly difficult for 
Sudan. Thanks to its support for jihadist 
groups such as al-Qaida and its involvement 
in attacks against the US embassies in 
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the US placed 
the Bashir regime on its list of State Spon-
sors of Terrorism (SST) in 1993. Sudan is 
currently in negotiations with the US ad-
ministration to be removed from the list. 
This would pave the way for debt relief and 
urgently needed financial support. But the 
negotiations are proving tough and com-
plex. With the current pandemic still ram-
pant, it is all the more important to find 
alternative ways of providing support to 
stabilise the country. 
Conflicts 
The Horn of Africa is the most conflict-
ridden region on the continent. At the same 
time, it hosts the most and largest peace 
missions, both from the United Nations and 
the African Union. 
The situation in socially, ethnically or 
religiously fragmented societies is currently 
very worrying. Conspiracy theories abound 
on social media and the virus is being used 
as an opportunity to encourage the use of 
violence against the supposed guilty parties. 
Since the onset of the Corona crisis, two 
different reactions have been observed in 
countries with armed opposition groups. 
In Sudan, some of the armed opposition 
groups are conducting peace negotiations 
with the interim government and a politi-
cal solution has become possible. Even 
those groups that are not currently involved 
in negotiations are following the UN Secre-
tary-General’s call for a temporary ceasefire. 
The response from jihadist groups such 
as al-Shabaab has been quite different, how-
ever. They are highlighting the weaknesses 
of the government and the AU Mission 
with increased attacks on security organs. 
In March, members of al-Shabaab brazenly 
met up for a multi-day strategy conference 
in Somalia. Al-Shabaab is able to use as 
political leverage humanitarian and medi-
cal aid for the people suffering in the areas 
it controls. 
Recommendations 
The response to Covid-19 from all internal 
and external actors involved in the Horn of 
Africa should not be to rely on more isola-
tionism, but on more networked thinking 
and action. Alongside short-term humani-
tarian aid from outside, long-term invest-
ment in social security systems is also 
required. 
As can be seen in the Horn of Africa, 
individual philanthropists such as Jack Ma 
or Bill Gates are providing more visible sup-
port than state actors. However, in order 
to meet the challenges, the work that con-
tinues to be done by multilateral organi-
sations financed and controlled by the 
member states of the United Nations is 
essential. 
What actors in the countries 
themselves should do 
The governments of Horn countries are 
faced with the challenge of how to best 
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achieve two main goals: regime stability 
and protecting the population. If they now 
focus only on keeping themselves in power 
and neglect the population, the crisis could 
end in chaos. By contrast, investing in their 
healthcare systems and communicating 
openly with the population would increase 
acceptance for the measures they put in 
place and strengthen the legitimacy of the 
government. Actively combatting corrup-
tion, especially in the health sector, should 
also be seen as an opportunity to gain the 
population’s trust. In order to do this, 
they will need to introduce anti-corruption 
measures, to develop structures and involve 
the populace in transparently determining 
the country’s needs. 
Overcoming the Corona pandemic will 
require solidarity. If this is lacking, for 
example because the population mistrusts 
the state power, then the virus quickly 
becomes ammunition for those who want 
to exploit it for selfish purposes and pro-
mote fragmentation. 
Widening social safety nets will give 
the governments greater legitimacy and 
increases the population’s trust in them. 
The latter is essential for governments to 
impose and effectively implement measures 
and restrictions. This is the only way to 
mobilise communities to ensure that infec-
tions are contained in the long-term. As 
Ebola has shown, it is the local associations, 
village and religious communities, families 
and clans that can effectively contribute to 
the containment of the virus and provide 
social support and care. It is, therefore, all 
the more important that representatives 
of religious communities, village leaders, 
women and youth associations as well as 
neighbourhood committees are involved 
and provided with funds. Even if it were 
desirable to involve the police and military 
in logistics and supply, this step must be 
considered carefully. Each case must be 
examined individually to determine the ex-
tent to which the security authorities are 
regarded as repressive organs that are en-
forcing the will of the authoritarian elites, 
or whether they have earned the trust of 
the population. 
Germany and Europe 
There are several challenges for Germany 
and Europe in dealing with Covid-19 in the 
Horn of Africa, but there are also opportu-
nities. 
In recent years, Germany has proven to 
be a reliable partner for those Horn coun-
tries in transition. It should, therefore, now 
move forward and not shy away from taken 
on the role of aid coordinator within the 
EU. This is especially true in Sudan, whose 
situation as a transition state is fragile, 
but has enormous geostrategic importance. 
Hosting a Sudan conference that would put 
together a package of funds from Europe, 
the US, the Gulf States and also from inter-
national financial organisations would be a 
step in the right direction. 
Options need to be developed for Sudan 
that give it to access the IMF’s aid fund 
despite being on the SST list. Europe could 
also assist Sudan in negotiations to access 
funds from international development orga-
nisations and the World Bank. In addition, 
Germany and Europe could lobby the Paris 
Club for debt relief. The bulk of Sudan’s 
foreign debt – ranging from $50 to $60 
billion – is owed to members states of the 
Paris Club. 
Debt relief is an important measure 
that can be swiftly implemented to give 
African states greater financial leeway in 
the Covid-19 crisis. 
However, investments should not be 
made without accompanying control 
mechanisms. Authoritarian and repressive 
governments should not be allowed to use 
Covid-19 aid measures to help them main-
tain power. It is vital that these investments 
are tied to expanding social infrastructure 
and democratic controls. 
The United Nations 
The United Nations should play a proactive 
coordinating role in this acute crisis. It has 
a wealth of experience in coping with crises, 
ranging from containing epidemics to man-
aging refugee camps and peace missions. 
Since the US government has stopped sup-
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porting the World Health Organization, it is 
imperative that Germany and Europe step 
up their efforts to provide multilateral solu-
tions and increase their funding. 
AU and IGAD 
The task force put together by the African 
Union AU Agency for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) could become a perma-
nent institution once this crisis abates and 
set itself the task of improving national 
security systems and advancing intercon-
nectedness throughout the continent. The 
Covid-19 pandemic could become a decisive 
turning point for the regional Intergovern-
mental Authority on Development (IGAD). 
The focus of its predecessor, IGADD, founded 
in 1986, was on regional development and 
drought control. Concentrating on these 
tasks would be forward-looking and preven-
tative, in the event of further pandemics 
and climate-related crises in the Horn of 
Africa. 
Dr. Annette Weber is a Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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